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Demand models
Demand models
Supply = infrastructure
Demand = behavior, choices
Congestion = mismatch
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Demand models
Demand models
Usually in OR:
optimization of the supply
for a given (fixed) demand
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Demand models
Aggregate demand
Homogeneous population
Identical behavior
Price (P) and quantity (Q)
Demand functions: P = f (Q)
Inverse demand: Q = f −1(P)
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Demand models
Disaggregate demand
Heterogeneous population
Different behaviors
Many variables:
Attributes: price, travel time,
reliability, frequency, etc.
Characteristics: age, income,
education, etc.
Complex demand/inverse
demand functions.
M. Bierlaire (TRANSP-OR ENAC EPFL) Introduction to disaggregate demand models January 28, 2013 6 / 58
Choice theory
1 Demand models
2 Choice theory
3 Operational model
4 Market shares
5 Willingness to pay
6 Price optimization
7 Summary
M. Bierlaire (TRANSP-OR ENAC EPFL) Introduction to disaggregate demand models January 28, 2013 7 / 58
Choice theory
Choice
Choice: outcome of a sequential decision-making process
Definition of the choice problem: How do I get to work?
Generation of alternatives: car as driver, car as passenger, train
Evaluation of the attributes of the alternatives: price, time, flexibility,
comfort
Choice: decision rule
Implementation: travel
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Choice theory
Choice theory
A choice theory defines
1 decision maker
2 alternatives
3 attributes of alternatives
4 decision rule
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Choice theory
Decision-maker
The decision maker is
an individual or a group of persons.
If group of persons, we ignore internal interactions.
Important to capture difference in tastes and decision-making
processes.
Socio-economic characteristics: age, gender, income, education, etc.
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Choice theory
Alternatives
Choice set
Environment: universal choice set (U)
Individual n: choice set (Cn)
Choice set generation
Availability
Awareness
Choice set type
Continuous
Discrete
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Choice theory
Continuous vs. discrete
Continuous choice set
✲
✻
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
qBeer
qMilk
 ✠
pBeerqBeer + pMilkqMilk = I
Cn
Discrete choice set
Cn = { Car, Bus, Bike}
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Choice theory
Attributes
Describe the item:
cost
travel time
walking time
comfort
bus frequency
etc.
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Choice theory
Decision rules
Neoclassical economic theory
Preference-indifference operator &
1 reflexivity
a & a ∀a ∈ Cn
2 transitivity
a & b and b & c ⇒ a & c ∀a, b, c ∈ Cn
3 comparability
a & b or b & a ∀a, b ∈ Cn
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Choice theory
Decision rules
Utility
∃ Un : Cn −→ R : a Un(a) such that
a & b ⇔ Un(a) ≥ Un(b) ∀a, b ∈ Cn
Remarks
Utility is a latent concept
It cannot be directly observed
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Choice theory
Utility and continuous choice set
Context for the decision maker
Q = {q1, . . . , qL} consumption bundle
qi is the quantity of product i consumed
Utility of the bundle:
U(q1, . . . , qL)
Qa & Qb iff U(q
a
1, . . . , q
a
L) ≥ U(q
b
1 , . . . , q
b
L)
Budget constraint:
L∑
i=1
piqi ≤ I .
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Choice theory
Utility and continuous choice set
Decision-maker solves the optimization problem
max
q∈RL
U(q1, . . . , qL)
subject to
L∑
i=1
piqi = I .
Example with two products
max
q1,q2
U = β0q
β1
1 q
β2
2
subject to
p1q1 + p2q2 = I .
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Choice theory
Utility and continuous choice set
Example with two products
max
q1,q2
U = β0q
β1
1 q
β2
2
subject to
p1q1 + p2q2 = I .
Lagrangian of the problem
L(q1, q2, λ) = β0q
β1
1 q
β2
2 + λ(I − p1q1 − p2q2).
Necessary optimality condition (KKT)
∇L(q1, q2, λ) = 0
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Choice theory
Utility and continuous choice set
KKT
β0β1q
β1−1
1 q
β2
2 − λp1 = 0
β0β2q
β1
1 q
β2−1
2 − λp2 = 0
p1q1 + p2q2 − I = 0.
We have
β0β1q
β1
1 q
β2
2 − λp1q1 = 0
β0β2q
β1
1 q
β2
2 − λp2q2 = 0
so that
λI = β0q
β1
1 q
β2
2 (β1 + β2)
KKT (ctd.)
Therefore
β0q
β1
1 q
β2
2 =
λI
(β1 + β2)
As β0β2q
β1
1 q
β2
2 = λp2q2, we obtain
(assuming λ 6= 0)
q2 =
Iβ2
p2(β1 + β2)
Similarly, we obtain
q1 =
Iβ1
p1(β1 + β2)
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Choice theory
Utility and continuous choice set
Demand functions
q1 =
Iβ1
p1(β1 + β2)
q2 =
Iβ2
p2(β1 + β2)
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Choice theory
Utility and discrete choice set
Binary optimization
max
q∈{0,1}L
U = U(q1, . . . , qL)
with
qi =
{
1 if product i is chosen
0 otherwise
and ∑
i
qi = 1.
No optimality condition. Calculus cannot be used anymore.
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Choice theory
Methodology
Utility functions
Do not work with demand functions anymore
Work with utility functions
U is the “global” utility
Define Ui the utility associated with product i .
It is a function of the attributes of the product (price, quality, etc.)
We say that product i is chosen if
Ui ≥ Uj ∀j .
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Choice theory
Example
Two transportation modes
U1 = −βt1 − γc1
U2 = −βt2 − γc2
with β, γ > 0
U1 ≥ U2 iff − βt1 − γc1 ≥ −βt2 − γc2
that is
−
β
γ
t1 − c1 ≥ −
β
γ
t2 − c2
or
c1 − c2 ≤ −
β
γ
(t1 − t2)
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Choice theory
Example
-4
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 2
 4
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Choice theory
Assumptions
Decision-maker
perfect discriminating capability
full rationality
permanent consistency
Analyst
knowledge of all attributes
perfect knowledge of & (or
Un(·))
no measurement error
Must deal with uncertainty
Random utility models
For each individual n and alternative i
Uin = Vin + εin
and
P(i |Cn) = P[Uin = max
j∈Cn
Ujn] = P(Uin ≥ Ujn ∀j ∈ Cn)
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Choice theory
Daniel L. McFadden
UC Berkeley 1963, MIT 1977, UC
Berkeley 1991
Laureate of The Bank of Sweden
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel 2000
Owns a farm and vineyard in Napa
Valley
“Farm work clears the mind, and the
vineyard is a great place to prove
theorems”
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Operational model
Assumptions on Vin
Vin = V (xin) = V (zin, Sn)
Variables
zin: vector of attributes of alternative i for individual n
Sn: vector of socio-economic characteristics of n
xin = (zin, Sn)
Functional form
Common assumption: Linear-in-parameter
Vin =
∑
p
βp(xin)p
β: vector of unknown parameters to be estimated
Possibility for nonlinear specifications.
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Operational model
Assumptions on εin
Mean: parameter to be estimated.
Variance: parameter that cannot be estimated, must be normalized.
Distribution: two common assumptions
Probit model
Normal distribution
Motivation: central limit
theorem
Logit model
Extreme value distribution
i.i.d. across i and n
Motivation: Gumbel’s theorem
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Operational model
Logit model
Utility
Uin = Vin + εin
Choice probability
Pn(i |Cn) =
eVin∑
j∈Cn
eVjn
.
Decision-maker n
Alternative i ∈ Cn
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Operational model
Model estimation
Design a sampling protocol
For each individual n in the sample, and for each alternative i ,
observe the explanatory variables xin
observe the dependent variable, that is the choice in.
Compute the likelihood as a function of the parameters β:
Λn(β) = Pn(in|Cn) =
eVinn∑
j∈Cn
eVjn
.
Compute the likelihood of the whole sample:
L∗(β) =
∏
n
Λn(β)
Solve the maximum likelihood problem:
β̂ = argmaxβ logL
∗(β) = argmaxβ
∑
m
log Λn(β).
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Market shares
Aggregation
Reality
Population composed of N individuals
For each alternative i , and each individual n, define
yin =
{
1 if individual n chooses alternative i ,
0 otherwise.
Total number of individuals selecting item i in the population:
N(i) =
N∑
n=1
yin.
Market share for item i :
W (i) = N(i)/N =
N∑
n=1
yin/N.
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Market shares
Forecasting
Replace yin by Pn(i |xn,Cn)
Total number of individuals selecting item i in the population:
N̂(i) =
N∑
n=1
Pn(i |xn,Cn)
Market share for item i :
Ŵ (i) = N̂(i)/N =
N∑
n=1
Pn(i |xn,Cn)/N.
Issue: no way to access xn for the entire population.
Solution: use a representative sample
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Market shares
Demand models
N̂(i) or Ŵ (i) are the demand models required for OR
They can be computed for subgroups of the population
They account for the heterogeneity of
behavior,
taste,
choice contexts.
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Willingness to pay
Value of time
Objective
Monetary value of travel time?
Cost - benefit analysis
Costs : CHF
Benefits : travel time savings
Definition
Price that travelers are willing to pay to
decrease the travel time.
Motivation
Total time budget is limited, saved time can
be used for other activities and, therefore,
has value.
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Willingness to pay
Example
Utility functions
U1 = −βt1 − γc1
U2 = −βt2 − γc2
with β, γ > 0
Choice assumption
U1 ≥ U2 if c1 − c2︸ ︷︷ ︸ ≤ − βγ︸︷︷︸(t1 − t2︸ ︷︷ ︸)
CHF
CHF
hours
hours
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Willingness to pay
Value of time
If utility function is linear
the value of time is the ratio between
the coefficient of the “time” variable, and
the coefficient of the “cost” variable
Warning: utility is not always linear
Value of time varies with
trip purpose
transportation mode
trip length
income
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Willingness to pay
Example: model choice in Nijmegen
Vcar = −0.798 −0.110 · costcar −1.33 · timecar
Vtrain = −0.110 · costtrain −1.33 · timetrain
Value of time = -1.33 / -0.110 ≈ 12 euros / h ≈ 0.20 euros / min
Case 1 Case 2
Time 2 h 1.5 h
Cost 7 e 13 e
Utility of train -3.43 -3.43
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Willingness to pay
Other willingness to pay indicators
Headway (i.e. time between two buses)
Number of transfers
Reliability
etc.
Same methodology:
The model must involve the corresponding variable
Willingness-to-pay = ratio between the coefficient of the variable and
the cost coefficient
U = −βt − γc − αn
Willingness-to-pay to have one less transfer: α/γ
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Willingness to pay
Value of time in Switzerland
Reference
Axhausen, K., Hess, S., Koenig, A., Abay, G., Bates, J., and Bierlaire, M. (2008). Income and distance elasticities of values of
travel time savings: new Swiss results, Transport Policy 15(3):173-185.
Data collection
Source for recruitment: survey “Kontinuierliche Erhebung zum
Personenverkehr” (KEP) by SBB/CFF
Stated preferences
Questionnaire designed based on a real reference trip
Three parts:
SP mode choice (car / bus or rail)
SP route choice (current mode or alternative mode)
Socio-demographics and information about the reference trip
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Willingness to pay
SP survey
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Willingness to pay
Data
Number of observations (1225 individuals)
Busin. Comm. Leis. Shop. Total
Mode : car/bus 6 162 186 126 480
Mode : car/rail 426 1716 2538 1104 5784
Route : bus for bus users 9 405 450 342 1206
Route : car for car users 156 846 1176 660 2838
Route : rail for car users 126 594 837 504 2061
Route : rail for rail users 324 1008 1881 288 3501
Total 1047 4731 7068 3024 15870
In average, 15870/1225 ≈ 13 valid responses out of 16 per respondent.
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Willingness to pay
Model specification
Variables
travel time
travel cost
level of congestion (car)
frequency (TC)
number of transfers (TC)
trip length
income
inertia
car availability
sex
1/2-fare CFF
general subscription
trip purpose
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Willingness to pay
Results
Business Commute Leisure Shopping
Time TC (CHF/h) 49.57 27.81 21.84 17.73
Time car (CHF/h) 50.23 30.64 29.20 24.32
Headway (CHF/h) 14.88 11.18 13.38 8.48
CHF/transfer 7.85 4.89 7.32 3.52
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Willingness to pay
Results
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Price optimization
Introduction
Choice model captures demand
Demand is elastic to price
Predicted demand varies with price, if it is a variable of the model
In principle, the probability to use/purchase an alternative decreases if
the price increases.
The revenue per user increases if the price increases.
Question: what is the optimal price to optimize revenue?
In short
Price↑⇒ profit/passenger↑ and number of passengers ↓
Price↓⇒ profit/passenger↓ and number of passengers ↑
What is the best trade-off?
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Price optimization
Revenue calculation
Number of persons choosing alternative i in the population
Nˆ(i) =
S∑
s=1
NsP(i |xs , pis)
where
the population is segmented into S homogeneous strata
pis is the price of item i in segment s
xs gathers all other variables corresponding to segment s
P(i |xs , pis) is the choice model
Ns is the number of individuals in segment s
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Price optimization
Revenue calculation
Total revenue from i
Ri =
S∑
s=1
NsP(i |xs , pis)pis
If the price is constant across segments...
Ri = pi
S∑
s=1
NsP(i |xs , pi )
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Price optimization
Price optimization
Optimizing the price of product i is solving the problem
max
pi
pi
S∑
s=1
NsP(i |xs , pi )
Notes:
It assumes that everything else is equal
In practice, it is likely that the competition will also adjust the prices
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Price optimization
Illustrative example
A binary logit model with
V1 = βpp1 − 0.5
V2 = βpp2
so that
P(1|p) =
eβpp1−0.5
eβpp1−0.5 + eβpp2
Two groups in the population:
Group 1: βp = −2, Ns = 600
Group 2: βp = −0.1, Ns = 400
Assume that p2 = 2.
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Price optimization
Illustrative example
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Price optimization
Sensitivity analysis
Parameters are estimated, we do not know the real value
95% confidence interval: [β̂p − 1.96σ, β̂p + 1.96σ]
Perform a sensitivity analysis for βp in group 2
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Price optimization
Sensitivity analysis
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